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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to section 78-
2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was there competent evidence to support the jury's verdict that the 
defendant was negligent and that his negligence proximately caused the plaintiffs 
injuries, and did the trial court therefore err in granting the defendant's motion for a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.)? 
Standard of Review 
In passing on a motion for a j.n.o.v., "a trial court has no latitude and must be 
correct." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991). The trial court 
can grant a j.n.o.v. only when the losing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). 
"Thus, the trial court may properly grant a motion for a j.n.o.v. only when the evidence 
is, as a matter of law, insufficient to support the jury verdict." Id. (citation omitted). The 
evidence is insufficient to support a verdict as a matter of law only if there was no 
competent evidence to support the jury's verdict, viewing the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
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party (here, the plaintiff). See id; Braithwaite v. West Valley City Corp., 921 P.2d 997, 
999 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). In determining whether there is competent evidence 
to support the verdict, the court must "accept as true all testimony and reasonable 
inferences flowing therefrom that tend to prove [the plaintiff's] case" and "disregard all 
conflicts and evidence that tend to disprove [his] case." Gold Standard, 915 P.2d at 
1066. 
2. Did the trial court err in concluding that the jury verdict was against the 
manifest weight of the evidence and that the damages were excessive, and did it therefore 
err in conditionally granting the defendant's motion for a new trial? 
Standard of Review 
A trial court's decision to grant or deny a new trial is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. See, e.g., Braithwaite, 921 P.2d at 1001 (quoting Amoss v. Bennion, 517 P.2d 
1008, 1010 (Utah 1973)). However, a trial court does not have discretion to grant a new 
trial "if there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict for either party and the judge 
merely disagrees with the judgment of the jury." Crookston, 817P.2dat799n.9. See 
also id. at 804. 
The trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial aosent a snowmg of one of the 
seven grounds listed in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a). Braithwaite, 921 P.2d at 
1001 (citation omitted). The trial court conditionally granted the defendant a new trial on 
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two grounds-that the damages the jury awarded were excessive, under Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59(a)(5), and that there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict, under 
rule 59(a)(6). (See Record ("R.") at 340-44, 400-01.) A trial court abuses its discretion 
in granting a new trial if the court could not "reasonably conclude that the jury had acted 
in a manner covered by the grounds stated in rule 59(a)(5) or (6)," that is, if it could not 
reasonably conclude that the jury "acted with passion or prejudice" or that the jury's 
verdict was "manifestly against the weight of the evidence." Crooks ton, 817 P.2d at 805, 
804 (Utah 1991). For the trial court to order a new trial, the verdict must be "clearly 
against the weight of the evidence," or there must be insufficient evidence to support the 
verdict or the jury must have clearly acted with passion or prejudice. See id at 799 n.9, 
804. 
The appellate court must determine whether there was "'"substantial competent 
evidence which would support a verdict for [the moving party],'"" Braithwaite, 921 P.2d 
at 1001 (citations omitted), and reverse the grant of a new trial if there is "no reasonable 
basis for the decision," Crookston, 817 P.2d at 805. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR RULES 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 50 governs motions for j.n.o.v. Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59 governs motions for new trials. The text of these rules is set out in the 
addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
This is an action to recover for personal injuries the plaintiff sustained when the 
defendant ran into him while they were both skiing at Snowbird Ski Resort in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
The case was tried to a jury on March 11, 12 and 13, 1996. (R. 150-51, 209.) 
After the parties rested, the defendant moved for dismissal. (R. 838.) The trial court 
denied the motion and allowed the case to go to the jury. (R. 842.) The jury returned a 
special verdict. It found that the defendant was negligent and that his negligence was a 
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. It found that the plaintiff was also negligent 
but that his negligence was not a proximate cause of his injuries. The jury awarded the 
plaintiff $16,458.84 for past medical expenses, $12,579 for past lost income and 
$100,000 for lost future income or loss of earning capacity, for a total award of 
$129,037.84. (R. 244-46.) A judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff and against 
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the defendant for $134,769.04, which included $5,731.20 in prejudgment interest. (R. 
270-72.) 
The defendant filed a motion for j.n.o.v. or alternatively for a new trial or for 
remittitur, on the groimds that (1) the jury's finding that the defendant was negligent was 
contrary to the evidence and against the law; (2) the jury's finding that the plaintiff's 
negligence was not a proximate cause of his injuries was contrary to the evidence and 
against the law; (3) the trial court erred in excluding expert testimony regarding the 
skier's responsibility code; and (4) the award of $12,579 for past lost wages was against 
the law because it was based on lost gross income, not net income. {See R. 273-87.) 
At the hearing on the defendant's motion, the trial court rejected the defendant's 
arguments based on the exclusion of expert testimony and the alleged inconsistency in the 
jury's finding that the plaintiff was negligent but that his negligence was not a proximate 
cause of his injuries. {See R. 340-42.) However, the trial court granted the defendant's 
motion for j.n.o.v. The court stated: 
I felt, at the time the jury brought the verdict back, that they were dead 
wrong. I felt, during the course of the trial, that there was no cause of 
action. 
. . . I'm still of the same opinion-even persuaded more—that there 
was no duty owed to the plaintiff. And—well, maybe I should correct that: 
there was a duty not to be negligent. But there was no negligence on the 
part of the defendant in this case, and negligence, if any, was on the part of 
the [plaintiff] and his failure to ski under control in consistency with the 
skier's code. 
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. . . [T]he plaintiff failed to adhere to the skier's code. As I say, it 
was negligence on his part, and the court is of the opinion that the jury was 
wrong, dead wrong, or I would not be taking the position I am. 
(R. 342-43.) The court further stated that it did not think there was even "an inference of 
negligence . . . on the part of the defendant." (R. 344.) The court concluded: 
My first inclination was to grant a new trial, but if the same evidence 
came up, and the same verdict came in, and the same motion was filed 
again, I would set it aside. Therefore, I feel compelled, and I do so, to grant 
the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
(R. 343.) 
The defendant submitted a proposed order granting his motion for a j.n.o.v. and 
conditionally granting his motion for a new trial, and the plaintiff objected to the 
proposed order. (See R. 346-47, 350-51, 363-69.) Following a hearing on the plaintiffs 
objections (R. 957-80), the court signed the defendant's proposed order but struck the 
paragraph conditionally granting a new trial (see R. 379, 383-85). The court later called 
counsel and indicated that it was amending its prior ruling to conditionally grant the 
defendant's motion for a new trial. (See R. 396-97.) Following another hearing (R. 982-
96), the court denied the plaintiffs objection to the proposed modification and entered an 
amended order nunc pro tunc conditionally granting the defendant's motion for a new 
trial (see R. 403, 399-401). 
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The plaintiff has appealed the trial court's order granting the defendant a j.n.o.v. 
and conditionally granting the defendant's motion for a new trial (R. 392), and the 
defendant has filed a cross-appeal (R. 404-05). 
B. Statement of Facts 
The plaintiff, Gary Ricci, is a self-employed shellfisherman from Rhode Island. 
(R. 542.) He and his wife came to Utah in 1986 to go skiing. They loved the skiing so 
much that they now own a home in Utah and spend their winters here skiing. Mr. Ricci 
considers himself "a highly advanced, expert skier." (R. 552-53.) 
On April 12, 1994, Mr. Ricci was skiing on a run known as Silver Fox or 
Anderson's Hill at Snowbird Ski Resort. (R. 556.) It was a beautiful spring morning. 
The sky was blue; the snow had been "catted" or groomed and was hard and smooth. (R. 
564-65.) Mr. Ricci was skiing on the left side of the groomed area. (R. 570.) The 
defendant, Dr. Schoultz, was skiing with several other skiers in front of Mr. Ricci in the 
middle of the groomed area. (R. 570.) Anderson's Hill slopes down and then flattens out 
into a "runout." (See R. 569.) There is a slight rise near the end of the runout. (R. 581-
82.) As skiers reach the runout, they customarily straighten out their path to maintain 
their speed and make it over the flat part. (R. 580-81.) Mr. Ricci was traveling about 
twenty miles per hour when he reached the runout. (R. 586.) Dr. Schoultz was traveling 
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at about the same speed and was about twenty feet in front of and ten feet to the right of 
Mr. Ricci. (R. 587.) The skiers9 rate of speed dropped off a couple of miles an hour as 
they went through the flat portion. (R. 677.) 
Dr. Schoultz had not had any trouble up to that point. (R. 588.) Suddenly, Dr. 
Schoultz lost control of his skis, started to fall and veered to the left, directly into Mr. 
Ricci's path. (R. 589-91, 605, 667-69.) Mr. Ricci swerved to the left to try to avoid Dr. 
Schoultz, but Dr. Schoultz hit Mr. Ricci on his right leg and forced him into a tree off the 
edge of the trail. (R. 592-93, 781-82.) The accident happened so fast that Mr. Ricci 
could not have avoided it. (R. 592-94, 606.) 
A ski patrolman who skied onto the scene shortly after the accident found Mr. 
Ricci lying in the well of the tree to the left of the run and Dr. Schoultz standing to the 
right of Mr. Ricci. (R. 775.) 
Dr. Schoultz is an advanced skier. He was capable of skiing the most difficult 
runs at Snowbird. (R. 821.) The area where the accident occurred is one of the easiest 
portions of the mountain. (R. 564-65, 817, 827.) 
At trial, Dr. Schoultz gave a different version of the accident. According to Dr. 
Schoultz, he did not lose control or begin to fall. (See R. 809-10.) He was skiing under 
control when Mr. Ricci struck him from behind on his right side, without any warning. 
(See R. 698-700, 806.) Dr. Schoultz claimed that a photograph taken of bruises on his 
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right side showed his version of the accident was correct. However, Dr. Schoultz failed 
to have any photographs taken of his left side, and his medical records showed that he 
was badly bruised on his left side as well, which was consistent with Mr. Ricci's version 
of the accident. {See R. 689-98, ex. P-18.)1 
Evidence was introduced of the skier's responsibility code, which provides in 
relevant part that a skier is to "[s]ki under control and in such a manner that you can stop 
or avoid other skiers or objects" and that, "[w]hen skiing downhill or overtaking another 
skier, you must avoid the skier below you." (Ex. P-12; see also R. 602, 606.) 
As a result of the collision, Mr. Ricci suffered five broken ribs, fractured his pelvis 
in two places, suffered fractures in his cervical vertebrae and lower back and suffered a 
collapsed lung and a tear in his spleen. (R. 610-13.) At the time of trial-almost two 
1
 This was just one of many inconsistencies in Dr. Schoultz's testimony. He 
testified in his deposition that he was moving exactly straight ahead at the time of the 
collision and was not making any turns {see R. 700), whereas in the incident report he 
signed the day of the accident Dr. Schoultz said he was making small turns in the runout 
(R. 702; ex. P-20). In his deposition, Dr. Schoultz testified that he was going no more 
than five miles an hour at the time of the accident (R. 700), yet in his statement given the 
day of the accident, he claimed he was going ten to fifteen miles an hour when he and 
Mr. Ricci hit the tree {see R. 703; ex. P-20). In his deposition, Dr. Schoultz testified that 
he and Mr. Ricci ended up in two separate trees, yet in the incident report he said they 
both hit a single tree. (R. 703; ex. P-20. See also R. 837.) In his deposition, Dr. 
Schoultz testified that he hit an elm tree, whereas in fact he hit an evergreen. {See R. 
705-06.) The day after the accident, Dr. Schoultz told his doctor that the accident 
occurred near a ski lift, yet at trial he admitted there was no ski lift anywhere near the 
accident. (R. 704.) 
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years after the accident-Mr. Ricci still had a lot of back pain, which made it difficult for 
him to work a full day. (R. 616-20.) 
Mr. Ricci has not been able to earn as much since the accident as he did before the 
accident because his income depends on the number of shellfish he is able to harvest, and 
he is no longer able to work as many hours or as efficiently as he did before the accident. 
(R. 621-25.) Before the accident, Mr. Ricci would fish about nine to ten hours a day. 
After the accident, Mr. Ricci has only been able to fish about five to six hours a day. (R. 
619.) Mr. Ricci introduced direct evidence of his gross revenues—the receipts for the fish 
he harvested before and after the accident. (See R. 623-25, 633-37.) Mr. Ricci also 
testified that his expenses remain essentially constant, regardless of whether he works 
five or six hours a day (as he could after the accident) as opposed to eight or ten hours a 
day (as he did before the accident). (R. 638-45.) The only expenses that are affected by 
the number of hours he works per day are fuel, which varies roughly according to the 
time he spends on the water, and wear and tear on his equipment; however, those 
expenses would not change drastically. (R. 641-45.) Gary Couillard, Mr. Ricci's expert 
on his economic losses, subtracted the expenses Mr. Ricci saved by not fishing as many 
hours each day to arrive at his net income loss. (See R. 747-52, 755.) According to Mr. 
Couillard, Mr. Ricci suffered a loss of $9,726 a year because of the accident. (R. 739.) 
Discounting this figure over time, Mr. Couillard testified that Mr. Ricci's average yearly 
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loss over his expected work life would be $6,991. (R. 740.) Mr. Couillard calculated 
Mr. Ricci's lost future income resulting from the accident as $199,994. (R. 752-53.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for a j.n.o.v. There was 
ample evidence to support the jury's verdict that the defendant was negligent and that his 
negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintifFs injuries. Therefore, the defendant was 
not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Point I.) 
The trial court also erred in conditionally granting the defendant's motion for a 
new trial. The jury's verdict was not clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
Instead, the trial court simply disagreed with the jury's verdict. That is not a sufficient 
reason for granting a new trial. Moreover, there was no evidence that the jury's damage 
award was given under the influence of passion or prejudice or that it was clearly 
excessive under any rational view of the evidence. In fact, the jury award was less than 
two-thirds of the amount the only evidence supported. (Point II.) 
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ARGUMENT 
L 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT. 
In ruling on a motion for a j.n.o.v., the trial court has no latitude but must be 
correct. Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1066 (Utah 1996). The 
trial court could only grant the motion if Dr. Schoultz was entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. Id That would only be the case if there was no competent evidence to 
support the jury's verdict, viewing all the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Ricci. See id. 
Here, there was ample evidence to support the jury's verdict that Dr. Schoultz was 
negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of Mr. Ricci's injuries. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Ricci, the evidence showed that Dr. 
Schoultz was an advanced skier who was capable of skiing the most difficult runs at 
Snowbird. (R. 821.) The accident occurred on the easiest portion of the mountain, on 
flat terrain and on "catted" or groomed snow. (See R. 817, 827, 564-65.) The day was 
clear; the weather was good; there were no irregularities in the snow surface; traffic on 
the run was light; and there was nothing in Dr. Schoultz's path to obstruct him or cause 
him to lose control. (R. 564-65, 604, 801, 829-30.) Mr. Ricci testified that, in his 
experience, if he were skiing on the flat area on groomed snow, he would not have lost 
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control of his skis if he had been paying attention to his skiing. (R. 678.) The jury could 
reasonably conclude that Dr. Schoultz lost control of his skis because he was not paying 
attention to what he was doing, that is, because he was negligent. There was no other 
explanation for why Dr. Schoultz lost control when he did. (See R. 605.) 
The evidence also showed that, when Dr. Schoultz lost control of his skis, he 
veered left and fell into Mr. Ricci. (See R. 605, 668-69.) Mr. Ricci testified that Dr. 
Schoultz9s loss of control was the cause of the collision. (R. 605.) 
Thus, there was competent evidence from which the jury could conclude that Dr. 
Schoultz was negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. 
The order granting a j.n.o.v. (prepared by the defendant) recites that the court 
found that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff. (See R. 384, 400, f 1.) The 
defendant never argued before moving for a j.n.o.v. that he did not owe Mr. Ricci a duty. 
In fact, the defendant requested (R. 489) and the court gave the jury an instruction stating 
that a person "has a duty to use reasonable care to avoid injuring other people or 
property." (R. 224.) At the hearing on the defendant's motion, the court acknowledged 
that Dr. Schoultz owed the plaintiff a duty not to be negligent (see R. 342), although the 
court later backtracked from that statement (see R. 960-61). 
The question of duty is one of law for the court to decide. See, e.g., Hunsaker v. 
State, 870 P.2d 893, 897 (Utah 1993). Absent a statute limiting the duty one skier owes to 
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another, a skier owes a duty to other skiers on the slope not to endanger them through the 
skier's own negligence. See, e.g., Novak v. Virene, 586 N.E.2d 578, 580 (111. App. Ct. 
1991), and cases cited therein, appeal denied, 591 N.E.2d 24 (111. 1992). Cf. Clover v. 
Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1040-43 (Utah 1991).2 
The skier's responsibility code, which the court cited in its oral ruling, recognizes 
that every skier has a duty to ski under control and in such a manner as to avoid other 
skiers. (See ex. P-12; R. 602.) Dr. Schoultz requested and the trial court gave the jury 
instructions to the effect that the parties owed each other a duty to use reasonable care to 
avoid injuring other people. (See R. 189, 224.) It was for the jury to decide whether or 
not Dr. Schoultz breached that duty, and it concluded that he did. 
The order granting the j.n.o.v. further states, "The evidence also established that 
the plaintiff was the uphill/overtaking skier and that the accident occurred while plaintiff 
was overtaking the defendant." (R. 384, 400 ^ 1.) The significance of this finding is not 
explained. Presumably, the court was alluding to the skier's responsibility code, which 
provides that, when "skiing downhill or overtaking another skier, you must avoid the 
skier below you." (See R. 606.) 
2
 The court in Clover held that a ski resort could be vicariously liable where its 
employee collided with and injured another skier while skiing to his workplace. The plaintiff in 
that case had settled her claim against the employee, so the only issue was the employer's liability. 
Obviously, if the employee skier owed no duty to the plaintiff, then the employee could not be 
liable to the plaintiff, and his employer could not be vicariously liable. Thus, Clover supports the 
proposition that one skier owes other skiers a duty to use reasonable care in skiing. 
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The evidence showed that, where the accident occurred, the ground was rising 
slightly. (See R. 581-82, 668.) Mr. Ricci testified that he was not skiing downhill at the 
time of the accident. (R. 606.) Thus, the jury could have found that Mr. Ricci was not an 
"uphill" skier at the time of the accident. Mr. Ricci also testified that he did not intend to 
overtake Dr. Schoultz. (R. 606.) At the time of the collision, the two skiers were 
traveling at almost the same speed. (R. 586-87.) 
Even if the court could properly find that Mr. Ricci was the uphill or overtaking 
skier and violated the skier's responsibility code, that would not justify a verdict in Dr. 
Schoultz9s favor. The skier's responsibility code does not establish the standard of care 
but is just some evidence of what is reasonable care under the circumstances.3 See, e.g., 
LaVine v. Clear Creek Skiing Corp., 557 F.2d 730, 733 (10th Cir. 1977). Cf. Yampa 
Valley Elec. Ass'n v. Telecky, 862 P.2d 252, 257 (Colo. 1993) (evidence of compliance 
3
 Indeed, the court so instructed the jury: 
In determining whether plaintiff and defendant used reasonable care at the 
time and place of the incident involved in this case, you may consider the 
provisions of the Skier's Responsibility Code as evidence of the care an ordinary, 
prudent person would use under the circumstances. However, the Skier's 
Responsibility Code is not a statute or ordinance and you are obligated only to 
consider it and other evidence received on the question in deciding whether a party 
did, or did not, exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. 
(R. 232.) Dr. Schoultz requested this instruction as an alternative to his proposed instruction 
number 9, which stated, "A skier has the duty to use reasonable care at all times to avoid placing 
others in danger," and then set out the specific duties recognized in the skier responsibility code. 
(SeeR. 194-95.) 
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with industry standards is not conclusive on the issue of due care but only one factor to 
be considered); Runkle v. Burlington K, 613 P.2d 982, 993 (Mont. 1980) (unless they 
have been adopted by a governmental agency so as to have the force of law, codes or 
standards are not conclusive of the standard of care); Hansen v. Abrasive Eng'g&Mfg., 
Inc., 856 P.2d 625, 629-30 (Or. 1993) (evidence of non-binding rules may be considered 
as relevant evidence of negligence, similar to evidence of industry custom); Wheeler v. 
Jones, 19 Utah 2d 392, 431 P.2d 985, 987 (1967) (it was not error to admit evidence of 
F.H. A. specifications where the trial court did not instruct the jury that the specifications 
were the standard of the community); Prine v. Thelen, 496 P.2d 905, 907 (Wyo. 1972) 
(evidence of custom in an industry does not fix the standard of care). A fortiori, the 
skier's responsibility code does not impose strict liability on a skier. Mr. Ricci testified 
that he did everything he felt was humanly possible to try to avoid Dr. Schoultz. (R. 
606.) He did his best to avoid Dr. Schoultz and in fact spared him severe injury, but there 
was not time for Mr. Ricci to stop before Dr. Schoultz veered into him. (R. 673.) The 
jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence that, even if Mr. Ricci was overtaking 
Dr. Schoultz at the time of the accident and did not "avoid" him, Mr. Ricci was not 
negligent or that his negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident. 
In any event, a finding that Mr. Ricci was "the uphill/overtaking skier" at the time 
of the accident would at most only provide some basis for finding that Mr. Ricci was 
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negligent. It would not excuse Dr. Schoultz's own negligence. The jury found that Mr. 
Ricci was negligent but also found that his negligence was not a proximate cause of his 
injuries. The trial court determined that the jury's latter finding was not improper. (See 
R. 342 ("it was not an inconsistency such that anything had to be done on it, or that the 
jury made any mistake on").) Thus, the court's finding that "the plaintiff was the 
uphill/overtaking skier and that the accident occurred while plaintiff was overtaking the 
defendant" does not justify a verdict in favor of the defendant as a matter of law. 
In short, under the facts of this case Dr. Schoultz was not entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law. It was therefore error for the trial court to grant his motion for j.n.o.v. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Dr. Schoultz moved for a new trial under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5), 
(6) and (7), on the grounds that (1) the jury awarded excessive damages, given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice, (2) there was insufficient evidence to justify the jury's 
verdict or it was contrary to law, and (3) the verdict resulted from an error in law. (R. 
273-74.) 
In granting a motion for a new trial, the trial court is required to state the reasons 
for its decision. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 804 (Utah 1991). The 
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reason for this is to allow the appellate court to determine whether the trial court 
impermissibly invaded the province of the jury: 
In order to eliminate speculation as to the basis of the exercise of 
judicial discretion in granting new trials, the record should show the 
reasons and make it clear the court is not invading the province of the jury. 
The trial court should indicate wherein there was a plain disregard by the 
jury of the instructions of the court or the evidence or what constituted bias 
or prejudice on the part of the jury. If no reasons need be given the 
province of the jury may be invaded at will.. . . The exercise of judicial 
discretion must be based upon some facts notwithstanding great latitude is 
accorded the trial court in such matter. 
Id. (quoting Saltas v. Affleck 99 Utah 381, 386-87, 105 P.2d 176, 178 (1940) (citation 
omitted)). 
Although in announcing its decision to conditionally grant Dr. Schoultz's motion, 
the court only mentioned the perceived insufficiency of the evidence {see R. 340-44), in 
its order granting the motion the trial court stated two grounds-that the evidence was 
insufficient, under rule 59(a)(6), and that the damages were excessive, under rule 
59(a)(5). The trial court found no error of law justifying a new trial under rule 59(a)(7). 
{SeeR. 400-01.) 
A. The Trial Erred in Granting a New Trial for Insufficiency of the Evidence. 
The trial court's power to order a new trial is to be exercised only "in those rare 
cases when a jury verdict is manifestly against the weight of the evidence," that is, where 
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"the jury's verdict is so contrary to the manifest weight [of the evidence] that the trial 
judge 'cannot in good conscience permit it to stand.'" Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 
530, 532 (Utah 1984) (quoting Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 441, 326 P.2d 722, 726 
(1958) (concurring opinion of Crockett & Wade, JJ.)). Because of a litigant's right to 
have a jury decide his case and the added expense and inconvenience of a new trial, "the 
granting of la new trial on an evidentiary basis under Rule 59(a)(6) should be exercised 
with forebearance [sic].'" Id. (quoting Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 
1982)). Although a trial court has discretion to grant a new trial where there is 
"substantial competent evidence which would support a verdict for the [moving party]," 
id (citations omitted), it is an abuse of the trial court's discretion to grant a party a new 
trial merely because it disagrees with the jury's decision: 
A trial court cannot grant a new trial if there is sufficient evidence to 
support a verdict for either party and the judge merely disagrees with the 
judgment of the jury. Mere disagreement is not a sufficient basis on which 
to set aside a verdict and order a new trial. Rather, a trial judge may 
properly grant a new trial.. . when he or she can reasonably conclude that 
the verdict is clearly against the weight of the evidence or that there is 
insufficient evidence to justify the verdict.... 
Croohston, 817 P.2d at 799 n.9 (citations omitted). 
Here, the testimony of the only eyewitness to the accident—Mr. Ricci—supported 
the jury's verdict that Dr. Schoultz was negligent. It showed that Dr. Schoultz lost 
control of his skis for no apparent reason other than his own inattention and that his loss 
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of control caused him to veer suddenly across the hill and crash into Mr. Ricci, forcing 
him off the trail and into a tree. (See supra point I.) 
The only contrary evidence was Dr. Schoultz's testimony. Dr. Schoultz testified 
that he was skiing under control when he was suddenly struck from behind on his right 
side by Mr. Ricci. (See R. 698-700, 806.) Although Dr. Schoultz had photographs of 
bruises on his right back side, which at first glance tended to confirm his story, his 
medical records showed that he sustained extensive bruising on his left side as well, and 
he conveniently failed to have any photographs taken of his left side. (See R. 689-98.) 
The jury was faced with two diametrically opposed versions of the accident—Mr. 
Ricci9s and Dr. Schoultz's. The independent, physical evidence tended to support Mr. 
Ricci's version of the accident. It showed that Dr. Schoultz had extensive bruises on his 
left side-a fact Dr. Schoultz initially tried to hide-which was inconsistent with his claim 
that Mr. Ricci ran into him from behind, on the right side. The independent evidence also 
showed that both skiers ended up off the trail to the left of the run, with Mr. Ricci in a 
tree well. This was also inconsistent with Dr. Schoultz's claim that Mr. Ricci had run 
into him from behind while he was in the middle of the run. If that were the case, the 
skiers would have ended up in the middle of the run. Their positions after the accident 
were consistent, however, with Mr. Ricci's testimony that Dr. Schoultz veered across the 
hill and forced Mr. Ricci off the run, to the left. The jury found Mr. Ricci's testimony 
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more credible. The trial court disagreed. However, the mere fact that the trial court 
thought the jury was "dead wrong" in its view of the evidence {see R. 342, 343) does not 
justify the trial court in setting aside the verdict and ordering a new trial. See Crookston, 
817 P.2d at 799 n.9, 804. It was for the jury to decide which witness to believe. The 
more compelling evidence supported Mr. Ricci, and the jury verdict reflected this. The 
trial court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial simply because it disagreed with 
the jury's decision.4 
The trial court also found that "the jury's conclusion that the plaintiff was 
negligent, but not a proximate cause of his own injuries, was not supported by sufficient 
competent evidence." (R. 400-01.) 
In fact, there was ample evidence from which the jury could have concluded that 
any negligence on Mr. Ricci's part was not the proximate cause of his injuries. For 
example, the evidence showed that Mr. Ricci did not verbally warn Dr. Schoultz of his 
presence. (R. 667.) The jury could have reasonably concluded that Mr. Ricci was 
negligent for not doing so but that a verbal warning would not have prevented the 
4
 In announcing its decision, the trial court stated that there was no 
negligence on the part of the defendant and that any negligence was the plaintiffs, for 
failing to ski under control as required by the skier responsibility code. (R. 342, 343.) 
Under the skier's responsibility code, both skiers—Mr. Ricci and Dr. Schoultz—had a 
responsibility to ski under control. {See R. 602.) Mr. Ricci testified that he was under 
control and that Dr. Schoultz lost control. (R. 602, 605.) Dr. Schoultz denied that he lost 
control before the collision. (R. 809-10.) The jury believed Mr. Ricci and not Dr. 
Schoultz. 
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accident, since the defendant lost control of his skis. The jury could also have concluded 
that Mr. Ricci was negligent for not skiing closer to the edge of the catted area of the 
runout (he was about five or six feet from the edge (see R. 570)), but that he would not 
have avoided the accident even if he had been a few feet further over. Based on Mr. 
Ricci's testimony that he could not have done anything to avoid the collision once Dr. 
Schoultz unexpectedly lost control and veered into his path, there was ample evidence to 
support the jury's conclusion that any negligence on the part of Mr. Ricci would not have 
changed the outcome and was not a proximate cause of the accident. 
In any event, Dr. Schoultz waived any alleged inconsistency between the jury's 
finding of negligence and its finding of no proximate cause as a grounds for a new trial 
when he failed to object to the verdict before the jury was discharged. See Bennion v. 
LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985). 
B. The Trial Erred in Granting a New Trial for Excessive Damages. 
The trial court also ruled that Dr. Schoultz was entitled to a new trial because the 
damages were excessive under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a)(5). (See R. 400.) 
Under that rule, damages must not merely be excessive, but they must appear "to have 
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice." Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(5). To 
justify a new trial for excessive damages under rule 59(a)(5), "the damage award must be 
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more than generous; it must be clearly excessive on any rational view of the evidence." 
Bennion, 701 P.2d at 1084. 
There is no reasonable basis for the trial court's decision that the damages in this 
case were excessive. 
The jury's award of damages comprised three parts: $16,458.84 for past medical 
expenses, $12,579 for past lost income and $100,000 for lost future income or loss of 
earning capacity. (R. 245-46.) The plaintiff did not seek and the jury did not award any 
general damages, that is, any amount for pain and suffering or loss of enjoyment of life. 
(See R. 868, 245-46.) Dr. Schoultz stipulated to the amount of past medical expenses. 
(R. 235, ex. P-24.) The only evidence at trial on the amount of lost income (past and 
future) was the testimony of the plaintiff and his expert economist, Mr. Couillard. Dr. 
Schoultz did not present any evidence of the plaintiffs lost income. 
Mr. Couillard testified that Mr. Ricci lost $9,726 a year because of the accident. 
(R. 739.) Thus, Mr. Ricci's losses for the nearly two years between the time of the 
accident and the time of trial would have totaled over $18,000. The jury only awarded 
about two-thirds of that amount.5 
5
 The jury's award was less than the evidence supported even if the jury had 
calculated Mr. Ricci's past lost income using his average yearly lost income discounted 
over the thirty-two more years he could be expected to work ($6,991) (see R. 740), rather 
than his lost income for 1994 and 1995, the two years before trial. 
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Similarly, Mr. Couillard testified (and the only evidence showed) that, 
conservatively estimated, Mr. Ricci's lost future income resulting from the accident was 
$199,994. (R. 752-53.) The jury awarded about half of this amount. 
Where, as here, the jury's damage award was substantially less than the only 
evidence justified, there is no reasonable basis to conclude that the jury's award was 
excessive or motivated by passion or prejudice, much less that it was "clearly excessive 
on any rational view of the evidence." See Bennion, 701 P.2d at 1084. Cf. Caskey v. 
Village ofWayland, 375 F.2d 1004, 1008 n.4 (2d Cir. 1967) (where a verdict is less than 
the damages the plaintiff has incurred and proved by undisputed evidence, it is the 
plaintiff—not the defendant-who is entitled to a new trial). The trial court therefore erred 
in conditionally granting Dr. Schoultz a new trial for excessive damages. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for a j.n.o.v. and 
conditionally granting his motion for a new trial. The court should therefore reverse the 
trial court's judgment and remand for entry of judgment in accordance with the jury's 
verdict. 
24 
DATED this 73ri day of October, 1997. 
WILCOX, DEWSNUP & KING 
Jeffrey D. Eisenberg 
Alan W. Mortensen 
Paul M. Simmons 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
(Original signature) 
25 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 73fq day of October, 1997,1 caused to be served 
two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant by U.S. mail, first-class postage prepaid, 
on the following: 
Paul Belnap 
Robert L. Janicki 
STRONG &HANNI 
#9 Exchange Place 
Sixth Floor Boston Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
f:\data\ccriz\wpwin60\ricci^)leading\brief.app 
26 
ADDENDUM 
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Rule 50. Motion for a directed verdict and for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when made; effect. A party who moves 
for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence offered by an opponent may 
offer evidence in the event that the motion is not granted, without having 
reserved the right so to do and to the same extent as if the motion had not 
been made. A motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a 
waiver of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved for 
directed verdicts. A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific 
ground(s) therefor. The order of the court granting a motion for a directed 
verdict is effective without any assent of the jury. 
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whenever a mo-
tion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for 
any reason is not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to 
the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the 
motion. Not later than ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has 
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment 
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his 
motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party, 
within ten days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in 
accordance with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial 
may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the 
alternative. If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment to 
stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or direct the 
entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no verdict 
was returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested 
verdict had been directed or may order a new trial. 
(c) Same: Conditional rulings on grant of motion. 
(1) If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, provided 
for in Subdivision (b) of this rule, is granted, the court shall also rule on 
the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it should be 
granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall spec-
ify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for a new trial. If the 
motion for a new trial is thus conditionally granted, the order thereon 
does not affect the finality of the judgment. In case the motion for a new 
trial has been conditionally granted and the judgment is reversed on 
appeal, the new trial shall proceed unless the appellate court has other-
wise ordered. In case the motion for a new trial has been conditionally 
denied, the respondent on appeal may assert error in that denial; and if 
the judgment is reversed on appeal, subsequent proceedings shall be in 
accordance with the order of the appellate court. 
(2) The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant 
to Rule 59 not later than ten days after entry of the judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. 
(d) Same: Denial of motion. If the motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on that motion may, as respon-
dent, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate 
court concludes that the trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, 
nothing in this rule precludes it from determining that the respondent is 
entitled to a new trial, or from directing the trial court to determine whether a 
new trial shall be granted. 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
